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Women's right to equal employment opportunity has been recog-
nized virtually worldwide. In fact, one-third of the total world labor
force consists of women.' As the higher echelons in employment are
reached, however, the number of positions occupied by women tapers
off dramatically.2 Thus, while the right to equal employment opportu-
nity is acknowledged, enforcement remains a formidable challenge.
Although facially similar laws prohibiting discrimination in the re-
cruitment, promotion and working conditions of women have been
enacted by United Nations member countries, the United States, the
European Community and Japan, the difference between equality in
law and equality in fact lies with their implementation.3
1 Lairold M. Street, International Commercial and Labor Migration Requirements as a Bar
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Many countries recognize the right of women to litigate in order
to bring about faithful adherence to equal employment opportunity
laws, but the burden of taking on an entire legal system often proves
too great for many women. For example, European Community law
does not allow for a private right of action against private companies.
A woman facing discrimination is therefore required to challenge na-
tional law in order to recover for such violations.
The risk of social stigmatization is another deterrent against the
use of the courts in asserting the right to equal employment opportu-
nity. In fact, in Japan, women are not even given use of the courts as a
remedy for discrimination. Even if such a remedy were available,
however, the social stigmatization they would face due to a cultural
aversion to litigation would prevent women from litigating their right
to equal employment opportunity. Thus, enforcement of equal oppor-
tunity laws is currently women's largest hurdle in asserting their rights,
and while litigation is the most effective means of enforcement, many
women are justifiably hesitant in using the courts as a remedy.
Part I of this comment presents the sources for the assertion of a
woman's right to equal employment opportunity in the world through
the United Nations, and particularly in the United States, Europe and
Japan. Part II examines the problem of enforcing equal employment
opportunity laws. Part III concludes with an analysis of the outlook
for women seeking to assert the right to equal employment opportu-
nity as well as an opinion as to the most effective means of asserting
one's rights.
I. SOURCES OF THE RIGHT To EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNrrY
A. The United Nations
The United Nations Charter provides that all member nations
"shall promote the fundamental freedoms without discrimination as to
race, sex, language, or religion."4 The U.N. further declares that
"every person has a right to work and that nondiscrimination in em-
ployment is a goal that all nations should aspire to achieve." 5 The
U.N. has thus created a number of treaties inspired by its vision of the
importance of protection of human rights through international law.
6
4 Id at 498 n.1.
5 Id at 497.
6 id at 499 n.5.
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The International Covenant and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women are two such treaties.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) also specifically es-
tablished the principle of non-discrimination in employment in 1944.7
The ILO has been instrumental in developing treaties and recommen-
dations which define rights and establish codes of conduct in labor
law.8 Such world community initiatives significantly effect the socio-
economic and legal status of individuals worldwide because they cre-
ate a norm of equality among different groups of individuals and are
considered legally binding on countries that ratify them.9
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly as part of the
international community's early efforts to give the full force of inter-
national law to the principle of human rights.10 The Covenant entered
into force in 1976, and 104 States have become Party to the Covenant
since.11 In June of 1992, the United States ratified the Covenant,
which then went into effect in September of 1992.12
Under the Covenant, each party undertakes to respect and to en-
sure all individuals within its territory and under its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the Covenant "without distinction of any kind,
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion. . ." (emphasis supplied); to adopt legislative or other measures
necessary to give effect to these rights; and to provide an effective
remedy to those whose rights are violated.' 3 Article 2 and Article 4
of the Covenant also call for non-discrimination and equal protec-
tion.14 Thus, parties to the covenant are required to provide equal
protection for all individuals through legislation and to provide a rem-
edy for individuals faced with discrimination. The Human Rights
Committee was established to monitor compliance with this
mandate.15
The issue of equal opportunity for women was specifically ad-
dressed by the U.N. in its Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (the "Women's Convention"). The
7 L at 499 n.5.
8 l at 499 n.5.
9 Ia at 499 n.5.
10 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 645, 649 (1992).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 650.
14 Ad. at 650.
15 Ld. at 650.
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Women's Convention is universal in its reach, comprehensive in scope
and legally binding in character.' 6 It was adopted unanimously by the
U.N. General Assembly on December 18, 1979, and over 100 coun-
tries have ratified or acceded to it.17 Article 1 of the Women's Con-
vention defines discrimination against women:
the term "discrimination against women" shall mean any distinction, ex-
clusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of
men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.'
8
Article 2 of the Women's Convention condemns discrimination
against women in all its forms and provides that states "pursue, by all
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimi-
nation against women" by enacting constitutional, legislative and ad-
ministrative measures.19 In protecting the rights of women on an
equal basis with those of men, states must also refrain from discrimi-
natory acts or practices in addition to providing sanctions for discrimi-
nation against women.20
Article 11 of the Women's Convention directly addresses employ-
ment. Article 11 states in part that:
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in the field of employment in order to en-
sure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in
particular:
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the
application of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment;
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the
right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service
and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including ap-
prenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training.
Article 4 of the Convention and its legal implications are of para-
mount importance.22 Not only does Article 4 acknowledge a funda-
mental right or freedom and provide protection to one special group,
16 Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi.
nation Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 643 (1990).
17 Id.
18 Id at 667.
19 Idat 647.
20 lId at 647.
21 IL at 696.
22 Note, Presentation of the Third Comparative Labor Law Roundtable: Unlawful Discrimi-
nation in Employment, 20 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 1, 6 (1990) [hereinafter Roundtable].
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it also provides a blanket provision reflecting a unified interpretation
of a general principle of law.3 There are three guarantees implicit in
article 4 that become entrenched in national law once the Convention
is ratified: (1) where preferential treatment is granted to a person of
one race or sex (i.e. affirmative action), that treatment will not be con-
strued as an illegal derogation from the general principle of equality;
(2) such measures will be adopted and will continue until the goals of
equal opportunity and treatment are achieved; and (3) states will
adopt positive action measures whenever necessary to achieve one of
the rights enshrined in the Convention and incorporated into their do-
mestic laws. 24 However, because article 4 does not provide sanctions
for breach, it is not as effective as it otherwise could be.
Another weakness is created by the problem of substantive reser-
vations to the Women's Convention. It has been claimed that the Wo-
men's Convention came into effect rapidly in part, because, under its
Article 28(2), it accommodates reservations that are not "incompati-
ble with the object and purpose" of the Convention.25 Thus, while
the Women's Convention may have maximized its universal applica-
tion, it may have sacrificed some of its integrity through flexible ac-
commodations of reservations.26 Discrimination may therefore still
exist subversive of the Convention, when states parties justify discrim-
inatory practices by referring to reservations made under Article 28(2)
of the Convention itselfY7
Finally, equal employment opportunity for women has been fully
recognized by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The ILO
has stated that all nations will have to adopt many approaches to the
question of working women28 Specifically, the ILO, in its 1985 World
Labor Report, layed out three major priority areas for action. With
respect to these areas, the ILO stated that: (1) women's work should
be perceived as an essential component of the development process;
(2) special measures should be taken to ratify and implement under
national legislation ILO and United Nations standards, especially on
equal employment opportunities, equal pay for equal work, working
conditions, job security and maternity protection; and (3) there is a
need to formulate national policies to accelerate the creation of pro-
ductive and equal employment opportunities for women so as to en-
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Cook, supra note 16, at 644.
26 Cook, supra note 16, at 644.
27 Cook, supra note 16, at 708.
28 Street, supra note 1, at 498.
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able them to participate more fully in economic growth and social
progress."2 9 Although not legally binding, the ILO Labor Codes are
valuable for the impact they might have on member states.30
B. The United States
In 1964, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act 4o ensure all
Americans "the rights, privileges, and opportunities which are the
birthright of all citizens."31 Title VII of the Civil Rights Code was
enacted with the goal of eliminating employment discrimination based
upon "race, color, sex, religion or national origin. "32 Under Title VII,
American women are clearly protected from employment discrimina-
tion in the United States. Much discussion has ensued, however, re-
garding the extraterritorial application of Title VII. Although
persuasive arguments have been made in favor of such application,
the Supreme Court struck down the extraterritorial application of Ti-
tle VII once and for all in 1991.33 This decision affirmed the 5th cir-
cuit's decision in Boureslan v. Aramco, a decision that was hotly
debated preceding the Supreme Court holding.34 The practical effect
of this decision is lack of protection against discrimination for U.S.
women employed overseas.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Code states in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment ... or (2) to limit, segregate or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin...35
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination by employers "engaged
in an industry affecting commerce," and defines commerce as "trade,
traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication
29 Street, supra note 1, at 498.
30 Street, supra note 1, at 499.
31 Conley . Schulte, Americans Employed Abroad by United States Firms are Denied Protec-
tion Under Title VII: EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 25 CREIGHTON L. Rv. 351, 364
(1991).
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
33 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
34 Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 892 F.2d 1271
(1990).
35 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a) (1988).
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among the several states; or between a State and any place outside
thereof."
3 6
However, the Supreme Court held in Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) v. Arabian American Oil Co., that Title
VII does not apply to American employers engaged in commerce
outside of the United States 7.3  The petitioner in this case,- Ali
Boureslan, was a naturalized United States citizen who was born in
Lebanon. 8 Boureslan worked for Aramco Services Company (ASC),
a subsidiary company of Arabian American Oil Company
(Aramco).3 9 He originally worked in Houston, Texas, which is ASC's
headquarters.40 Boureslan was then transferred Saudi Arabia to work
for Aramco.41 Boureslan claimed that, after his transfer to Saudi Ara-
bia, he was subjected to a "campaign of harassment" that included
racial, religious, and ethnic slurs by his supervisor, that eventually led
to his termination.42 He filed a Title VII action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas and his case was dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.43 On appeal to the Fifth
Circuit, the district court decision was affirmed.44
The Supreme Court affirmed the 5th Circuit's decision, and held
that Title VII does not apply extraterritorially to regulate the employ-
ment practices of United States firms that employ American citizens
abroad.45 The Court stated that the language in Title VII is too am-
biguous to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion of American law.46 The Court further stated that, absent clearer
evidence of congressional intent, it was unwilling to ascribe to Con-
gress a policy which would raise difficult international law issues by
imposing the United States' employment-discrimination regime upon
foreign corporations in foreign commerce and that, had Congress in-
tended extraterritorial application, it would have addressed the sub-
ject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures. 47 With respect to
the issue of deference to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, the
36 Schulte, supra note 31, at 364.
37 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1227.
38 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1229.
39 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
40 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
41 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
42 Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988).
43 Id. at 1014.
44 Id. at 1014.
45 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227.
46 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1231.
47 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1234.
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Court held that the EEOC interpretation was of insufficient weight to
overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application.48 Fi-
nally, the Court stated that Congress is aware that it needs to make a
clear statement when a statute is to be applied abroad, and that it may
amend Title VII if it intends legislate extraterritorially. 49
The Supreme Court's decision has been widely criticized. While
the Court refused to apply Title VII extraterritorially because of the
possibility of a conflict of laws, it has been argued that the Court
failed to inquire whether the application of Title VII to American citi-
zens employed by United States firms abroad would interfere with the
laws of foreign nations.50 Further, it has been argued that the Court
ignored the contention of the EEOC that applying Title VII would not
create a serious potential for conflict, partly because it specifically ex-
cludes aliens from coverage outside of the United States.51 For this
oversight, the Court has been criticized for two reasons. First, the
Court has been criticized for a flawed analysis of the alien provision in
Title VII. The EEOC concluded that because Congress exempted
aliens from protection under Title VII, and not all individuals, Con-
gress must have intended American citizens to be protected abroad.52
Further, the legislative history and pertinent administrative interpre-
tations of Title VII clearly indicate that foreign employers outside of
the United States are not regulated by Title VII.53 As such, the Court
may have erred in its interpretation of the alien provision. Second, the
Court has been criticized for not giving proper deference to the
EEOC interpretation. 54 It has been argued that the Court used a
standard of deference much narrower than the "reasonableness" stan-
dard which had been previously established.55 While Justice Scalia did
state that the reasonable standard was the appropriate standard in his
separate opinion, he ultimately concluded that the EEOC interpreta-
tion was not reasonable and he therefore concurred in the judgment.56
Ironically, the Supreme Court has held that the alien exemption
provision protects aliens employed within the United States from dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
48 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1235.
49 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1236.
50 Schulte, supra note 31, at 370.
51 Schulte, supra note 31, at 371.
52 Schulte, supra note 31, at 372.
53 Schulte, supra note 31, at 372.
54 Schulte, supra note 31, at 373.
55 Schulte, supra note 31, at 373.
56 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., ill S. Ct. 1227.
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but not from discrimination based on citizenship.57 Therefore, a non-
American woman working in the United States is protected from dis-
crimination based on sex, but may still be subject to discrimination
based upon her non-citizenship. American women, however, are not
even afforded this much protection when working for an American
corporations overseas.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, American women
face the dilemma of taking a foreign assignment and forfeiting the
protections of Title VII or rejecting the foreign assignment and limit-
ing their opportunities for advancement. 58 Even worse, it is now pos-
sible for an employer with a discriminatory motive to relocate an
employee overseas for the sole purpose of firing that employee .19
The only hope for American women is that Congress will recog-
nize the error that has been committed by the courts and amend or
clarify Title VII in order to ensure that an American woman em-
ployed by an American corporation will not be left without legal re-
course against discrimination simply because she is transferred to an
overseas office.
C. The European Community
In 1957, the Council of Organizations for European Economic
Cooperation began negotiations for the establishment of a free trade
area.60 Negotiations led to the Treaty of Rome, which was originally
signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg.61 In 1973, Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom
obtained membership; Greece joined in 1979; and Spain and Portugal
joined in 1986.62 The Treaty of Rome established the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) and set forth principles regarding the free
flow of capital, people and goods among the Community's members.63
The Treaty of Rome established four principle European Com-
munity institutions."4 The Commission is responsible for proposing
and enforcing legislation; the Council of Ministers, composed of mem-
57 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
58 Michelle J. Ledina, The Multinational Enterprise and Title VII: Equal Employment Oppor-
tunities for Americans at Home and Abroad, 4 EMORY IT'L- L. RFv. 373, 380 (1990).
59 Schulte, supra note 31, at 375.
60 Employment Regulation in a United Europe: A Survey of Expectations in the European
Community, Bureau of National Affairs Daily Labor Report, June 22,1990, Special Report S-1,
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bers from the 12 EC states, has the ultimate authority to implement
EC law; the European Parliament reviews proposed legislation and
acts as a public forum; and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the
EC supreme court.65
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome mandates equal pay for men
and women for "equal work" and was included for economic rea-
sons.6 6 In 1957, only one Member State had implemented equal pay,
and did not want unfair competition from other Member States in
which cheaper female labor was used.67 Further, articles 46, 52 and 60
of the Treaty require equal treatment of Community citizens with re-
gard to the right of work, freedom of establishment, and freedom to
provide services. 68 While such equal rights policies were originally ec-
onomically based, the European Court of Justice has added a human
rights dimension, and has characterized these rights as "fundamen-
tal."'69 Despite these provisions, however, the Treaty of Rome does
not include provisions regarding access to employment.7 °
For this reason, in 1976, the Council of Ministers adopted Council
Directive 76/207, the Equal Treatment Directive, in order to enhance
the status of working women with regard to entry opportunities in the
labor market.71 The equal treatment directive applies to access to em-
ployment, promotions, vocational training, and working conditions.72
It requires Member States to implement the principle of equal treat-
ment, meaning that "there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on
grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to
marital or family status."73 The directive further requires Member
States to provide judicial remedies for the persons alleging an in-
fringement of the equal treatment principle.74
As such, the directive mandates that all jobs at all levels of the
occupational hierarchy be open to both women and men, and applies
65 Id.
66 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 14-21.
67 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 21.
68 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 10.
69 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 21.
70 See generally Roundtable, supra note 22, at 14-21.
71 George Argiros, Sex Equality in the Labour Market and the Community Legal Order: An
Attempt at an Appraisal, 11 LIVERPOOL L. REv. 161, 164-65 (1989).
72 Harvey, Equal Treatment of Men and Women in the Work Place: The Implementation of
the European Community's Equal Treatment Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 38
AM. J. Come. L. 31, 37 (1990).
73 Id. at 36.
74 Argiros, supra note 71, at 165.
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to subtle as well as overt forms of discrimination. 75 Subtle discrimina-
tion refers to gender neutral legislation or employer practices that
have a discriminatory effect, as well as to discrimination by reference
to marital or family status.76 However, while the directive provides
judicial recourse for women faced with discrimination, it does not pro-
vide any criterion regarding the appropriate sanctions and remedies
when discrimination is found to have occurred.77
Further, the directive is limited by three exceptions which leave
some room for inequality. Under these exceptions, Member States
may distinguish between men and women if: (1) sex is a determining
factor in ability to perform the work; or (2) the provision protects wo-
men; or (3) the provision promotes equal opportunity for men and
women.78 The first and second exceptions have been extensively used
to uphold otherwise discriminatory legislation. For example, particu-
larly in Germany, extensive legislation designed to protect women,
usually during pregnancy, has been upheld under the second excep-
tion.79 Thus, the second exception excludes women, regardless of
their wishes, from activities which the Member State has determined
are dangerous for women or their offspring.80 Other exceptions to the
directive have been implied. Case law has demonstrated that indirect
discrimination, expressly prohibited by the Directive, may be justified
if shown to be the consequence of some policy followed for other rea-
sons which amount to a "real need" of the employer or a priority con-
sideration of social policy for the State.81 Because of the express
exceptions and the broad language of the directive permitting implied
exceptions, the equal treatment directive does not provide particularly
clear guidance to the EC Member States.
Finally, the EC has the power to pass initiatives promoting equal
employment opportunity for women. In July of 1990, the Commission
adopted three initiatives to develop new qualifications and opportuni-
ties for employment in the Community from 1990 to 1993.82 The sec-
ond initiative, the NOW programme, was developed to "improve the
75 Harvey, supra note 72, at 37.
76 Harvey, supra note 72, at 37.
77 Argiros, supra note 71, at 165.
78 Harvey, supra note 72, at 37.
79 Harvey, supra note 72, at 50-53.
80 Harvey, supra note 72, at 38.
81 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 20.
82 Human Resources: 600 Million Ecus for Three New Community Initiatives, EUROPEAN
REP., July 21, 1990, § IV at 6.
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level of equality between men and women in the domain of employ-
ment, training and professional education."'
Women's right to equal employment opportunity may be signifi-
cantly expanded under a unified Europe. The European Community
program to create a "single market" was scheduled for January of
1993.84 As part of its single market program, the EC is standardizing
"social policy" throughout its 12 member states.8 5 Again, the justifica-
tion is economic: standardized working conditions minimize the pos-
sibility that some countries will be able to attract industry merely
because their pay and working conditions are below those of other
countries.8 6 This phenomenon has been referred to as "social
dumping.87
In 1989, the Commission issued a "Social Charter" along with an
implementing document called the "Social Action Program" as an ad-
dition to the Single European Act, which, until that time, had ad-
dressed only trade matters. 88 The Social Action Program specifically
outlines how the EC plans to implement worker rights. 89 The Social
Charter guarantees twelve rights to all EC workers, the seventh right
being the Right to Equal Treatment Between Men and Women.90 The
Charter seeks to outlaw sex discrimination in part by guaranteeing the
"principle of equality" in "access to employment, remuneration,
working conditions, social protection, education, vocational training,
and career development." 9' The Charter also states that measures
should be developed enabling men and women to reconcile occupa-
tional and family obligations, and, in its third proposal, requires a min-
imum period for maternity leave.92 It is the responsibility of Member
States in accordance with national practices, notably through legisla-
tion, to guarantee the fundamental rights in the Charter.93 United
States employers operating in the EC would also be subject to these
83 Ld.
84 Daily Labor Report, supra note 60, at S-3.
85 Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights in the Post-1992 European Communities: What
"Social Europe" Means to United States-Based Multinational Employers, 11 Nw. J. INTr'L L. &
Bus. 564 (Winter 1991).
86 Daily Labor Report, supra note 60, at S-3.
87 Daily Labor Report, supra note 60, at S-3.
88 Dowling, supra note 85, at 582.
89 Dowling, supra note 85, at 582.
90 Dowling, supra note 85, at 604.
91 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (COM 89), 568 final (1990).
92 Id
93 Dowling, supra note 85, at 604.
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requirements and would need to ensure that their employment prac-
tices kept up with the EC's emerging regulations.94
However, the Social Action Program is not binding on the Mem-
ber States and must be approved in the form of individual pieces of
legislation by the Council of Ministers.95 Much of the legislation has
been argued heatedly and has met with much opposition, especially
from the United Kingdom. Many feel that the competitive gains from
a single market will be outweighed by the increased costs of employ-
ing EC workers, and of doing business in the EC.96 However, the
right to equal treatment should not radically affect those employers
which already strive for sex-neutral hiring, pay, promotion, benefits
and training programs. 9 7 The United Kingdom, in particular, has re-
fused to agree to elements of the Social Action Program. Margaret
Thatcher, and now John Major, have opposed much of the Social Ac-
tion Program on the grounds that it will damage the competitiveness
of British companies within the Community.98
The Treaty of European Union was signed at Maastricht in the
Netherlands on February 7, 1992.99 While the Social Action Program
was not adopted by the Treaty, the Treaty implements the social policy
of the Treaty of Rome with minor limitations."° The Treaty also
strengthens the Community's capacity to ensure that its common poli-
cies are effectively and properly implemented.' 0 ' Under the Treaty, if
the Court of Justice finds that a Member State has failed to fulfill an
obligation, the State is required to take the necessary measures to
comply and the Court is allowed to impose sanctions in the form of a
lump sum or penalty payment. 02
Support for the Treaty was less than enthusiastic, however. In
June 1992, Denmark rejected the Treaty, and France approved it by
only a slim margin in September 1992.1°3 Further, Britain opted out
of certain aspects of the European social policy outlined in the Maas-
94 Dowling, supra note 85, at 605.
95 Daily Labor Report, supra note 60, at S-3.
96 Dowling, supra note 85, at 619.
97 Dowling, supra note 85, at 616.
98 Ivan Owen, Major Promise Over EC Social Action Proposals; Prime Minister's Questions,
FrN. TimS, Dec. 4, 1991, at 12.
99 Peter Ludlow, The Maastricht Treaty and the Future of Europe, 15 WASH. Q. 119 (1992).
100 Wolfgang Munchau, The Auf Wiedersehen Pet Factor in Britain's Opt-out at Maastricht,
TimEs (London), March 13, 1992, at 25.
101 Ludlow, supra note 99, at 126.
102 Ludlow, supra note 99, at 127.
103 Simon Alterman, EC Union Plans Severely Wounded by French Vote, REuTER LIBRARY
REP., Sept. 21, 1992.
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tricht Treaty, specifically, an agreement to extend the EC's powers in
certain limited areas." 0 Further, although the Maastrict Treaty went
into effect in November 1993 (despite the January 1993 deadline),
Great Britain ratified the Treaty excluding its social policy. Thus,
while a unified Europe could significantly enhance the right to equal
employment opportunity, the limitations imposed upon the social as-
pects of the Treaty weakens the effect it might otherwise have had on
equal employment opportunities for women.1°5
D. Japan
Primarily due to international pressure, the Japanese legislature
passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) in 1985,
which calls for equality in job recruitment, training and promotion.
1' 6
However, because Japan was not entirely ready for this step, the Japa-
nese law takes a gradualistic approach, and enforcement is by non-
coercive means.10 7
Image problems and international criticism were direct stimuli to
the passage of the EEOL. 08 The United Nations claimed the years
1976 through 1985 as the Decade for Women, and in 1980, Japan
signed the U.N. Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women. 10 9 Japan responded sluggishly, however, due
to its discomfort with the idea that a change was necessary. 0, Upon
signing the Convention, Japan was required to undertake "all appro-
priate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimina-
tion.""' With the passage of the EEOL in 1985, Japan was able to
ratify the Convention, although some doubted that the EEOL was
sufficient to fulfill its obligation as a ratifier.112 Japan felt additional
104 Munchau, supra note 100.
105 The Maastrict Treaty suffered many setbacks due to economic hardship and political strife
such as that in Yugoslavia. While the Maastricht Treaty was eventually ratified, it is not likely to
encompass a unified social policy in the near future. The Treaty has been modified in this area
due to member states' fears of losing sovereignty to the "Brussels" bureaucracy. As such, the
prospects for an immediate impact are much better for a unified currency rather than a unified
social policy under the Maastrict Treaty. See generally, Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht: A
Premature Treaty, Council on Foreign Relations, December 1992 at 117.
106 Loraine Parkinson, Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law: An Alternative Ap-
proach to Social Change, 89 CoL L. REv. 604 (1989).
107 Id.
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pressure to pass the EEOL due to its economic dependence on other
nations, both as a source of natural resources and as a market for the
export of its manufactured goods.113
Domestic forces also played a part in speeding up the passage of
equal opportunity legislation in Japan. 114 Domestic pressure was cre-
ated as a result of Japan's rapid economic development and the large-
scale entry of women into the labor market." 5 As women came to
play a larger role in the Japanese workforce, work outside the home
came to play a larger role in the lives of Japanese women.116 How-
ever, this fact alone would have been insufficient to cause the passage
of the EEOL because neither Japanese women nor Japanese men
were entirely ready for the law.117 Male-dominated business was not
prepared to receive women as full equals partly due to the fact that
Japanese employment customs require a total commitment to the
firm, and the combination of family and career is incompatible with
this custom." 8 Nor were women fully prepared to qualify for equal
treatment, as the majority of women continued to see marriage and
home as their central role in life, with career being secondary." 9 The
Japanese judgment, therefore, was that a change of such great magni-
tude could best be achieved not through imposition of force, but
through incremental change on a voluntary basis.'20
As such, the EEOL was structured under the principles of volun-
tarism and gradualism.' 2' The EEOL was officially entitled the Law to
promote the Welfare of Female Workers by Providing for Equality of
Opportunity and Treatment in Employment for Women."2 It divides
employment into five categories and establishes generalized standards
for equality of treatment in each of them. The five areas of employ-
ment are: (1) recruitment and hiring; (2) job assignment and promo-
tion; (3) education and training; (4) employee benefits; (5) mandatory
retirement age, retirement and dismissal."2
In the areas of recruitment/hiring and job assignment/promotion,
employers must "endeavor" to give equal opportunity and treat-
113 See generally Street, supra note 1, at 508.
114 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 620.
115 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 620.
116 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 620.
117 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 627.
118 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 627.
119 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 627.
120 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 605.
121 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 605.
122 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 605.
123 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 606.
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ment. 24 Specific standards are set up in the form of "guidelines."' 25
In the first area, the guidelines state that employers must not set up
classifications in recruitment and hiring that eliminate women from
consideration, use job names connoting maleness, or establish age
ranges, marital status or residence with parents as preconditions to
employment. 126 With regard to job assignment and promotion, em-
ployers must not eliminate female workers from consideration for as-
signment to a given post, or single out female workers for assignment
to disadvantageous or undesirable positions." 7 Further, employers
must not eliminate women from consideration for advancement to po-
sitions beyond a certain level because they are women, nor may em-
ployers set higher standards for women than for men. 28
In the last three categories of education and training, employee
benefits, and retirement and dismissal, employers are "prohibited"
from discriminating against women on the basis of sex, and specific
standards are set out in the form of Ministerial Ordinances, as op-
posed to the "guidelines" set out for the first two categories of em-
ployment.129 In none of the five categories does the law provide for
enforcement by a private right of action, however.'
30
There are three explanations for the Japanese legislature's refusal
to provide a private right of action. The first is the fact that legal suit
in Japan is not a favored means of dispute resolution and does not
enjoy the full approval of society.' 3 1 Secondly, legal suit is emotion-
ally and financially burdensome.132 Finally, Japan felt that because it
was first necessary to create a social consensus that the change was
necessary, a more gradualistic approach would better foster this
consensus.1
33
The EEOL thus provides three other mechanisms to carry its pro-
visions into effect. The first mechanism is a provision for the volun-
tary resolution by employers of complaints relating to equality of
opportunity and treatment after hiring; the second provides for medi-
ation or other assistance in dispute resolution by the Ministry of La-
bor (MOL) if voluntary efforts at resolution are ineffective; and the
124 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 606-607.
125 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 607.
126 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 610.
127 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 611.
128 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 611.
129 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 607.
130 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 607.
131 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 637.
132 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 637.
133 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 628.
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third mechanism involves investigations by, and advice, guidance and
recommendations from, the Minister of Labor or the Director of the
Prefectural Office of Women's Affairs to employers.3 All three of
these mechanisms use a non-coercive means to enforce, and there are
no sanctions for recalcitrant employers.135
Progress has been very slow under the EEOL, partly due to lack
of enforcement and partly due to the fact that women are not yet de-
manding equal employment opportunity. 36 Many women are satis-
fied with the status quo, perhaps because there are certain
prerogatives and privileges associated with a dependent, subordinate
status.137 Women may fear that they could end up losing more than
they could gain by enforcing the EEOL, family being one such loss. 138
However, some changes have resulted since the enactment of the
EEOL. First, help wanted ads have changed by eliminating gender
specification. 139 Also, female university graduates, previously ex-
cluded from the workplace, have been given increased opportunity.
14
Further, starting salaries have equalized and companies have revised
some of their rules of employment.' 41 Lastly, a two-track employment
structure has been developed for women.142 Women are now given
the choice of the "standard track" in which they continue in the tradi-
tional role as assistants with no opportunities for promotion and the
expectation of retirement at a marriageable age, or the "management
trainee" track in which they are subject to the same requirements as
men regarding extensive overtime work, transfers, and total commit-
ment to the firm."43
On the other hand, there are still some significant problems with
the EEOL. First, progress has only been made on entry level employ-
ment.'" Also, it is unclear whether changes at the recruitment stage
will actually result in an increase in the number of female employ-
ees.145 Thirdly, only a tiny percentage of women actually enter the
management trainee track, partly because employers have painted an
134 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 639.
135 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 639.
136 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 649.
137 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 633.
138 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 633.
139 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 645.
140 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 645.
141 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 647.
142 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 646.
143 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 647.
144 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 649.
145 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 649-50.
429
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:413 (1994)
overly harsh picture of the demands that will be made. 46 Again, the
most significant problem with the EEOL, however, is the fact that it
does not punish violators.
II. EQUALITY IN LAW VERSUS EQUALITY IN FACT: THE PROBLEM
OF ENFORCEMENT.
Despite the worldwide policy of providing equal employment op-
portunity for women, enforcement of this right remains a very real
problem, and women have little recourse when faced with discrimina-
tory practices. Forcing an employer to provide equal employment op-
portunity often requires use of the courts. Litigation is extremely
burdensome and usually requires blatant discrimination before a wo-
man is willing to take on a company, or, even more formidable, her
entire country.
A. The United Nations
The United Nations' Human Rights Treaties apply only to mem-
ber nations, and there are no sanctions for a nation's failure to imple-
ment legislation. 4 7 Further, even though many states have ratified
the Women's Convention and are thereby required under Article 24
to adopt all necessary measures aimed at achieving the full realization
of the rights recognized in the Convention, many have ratified the
treaty with substantial reservations.148 Article 28(2) allows states to
ratify the Treaty if their reservations are not incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention.149 However, such reservations
tend to compromise the integrity of the Convention's principles.15 0
Although Article 24 of the Convention does not require member
states to provide for a private right of action for women, states are
required to provide sanctions for discriminatory practices.' 5 ' Further,
article 17 establishes a monitoring body called the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), whose task
is to continually observe states parties' behavior and performance.'5 2
Members of CEDAW have closely questioned states regarding their
reservations to the treaty, and have encouraged them to review and
146 Parkinson, supra note 106, at 650.
147 See Cook, supra note 16.
148 See Cook, supra note 16.
149 See Cook, supra note 16, at 644.
150 See Cook, supra note 16, at 644.
151 See Cook, supra note 16, at 647.
152 See Cook, supra note 16, at 647.
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amend their laws and policies in compliance with the Convention in
order to facilitate withdrawal of reservations.1
53
Private individuals may complain to a Human Rights Committee
only if their nation has accepted the Optional Protocol under the
Political Covenant.' 54 Thus, only where provisions of the Women's
Convention coincide with those of the Political Covenant, may issues
related to their enforcement be adjudicated by the Human Rights
Committee.
When member nations have a dispute, they may request adjudica-
tion by the International Court of Justice. 55 The International Court
of Justice (ICJ) has also held that the General Assembly is competent
to both request the Court's opinion and enforce that opinion.156 This
is important as follows: first, the CEDAW monitors observance and
implementation of the Women's Convention; the CEDAW then re-
ports its findings to a body called the ECOSOC; the ECOSOC acts
subject to the General Assembly.157 Thus, the General Assembly may
request and then enforce an ICJ opinion regarding principles articu-
lated in the Women's Convention. This may seem, and is, a compli-
cated process and therefore not very effective in implementing
Convention principles. Thus, use of the United Nations' Convention
as a source for asserting the right to equal employment opportunity is
unrealistic and unlikely to effect much change.
B. The United States
It seems ironic that in a country thought to have led the Civil
Rights movement, there is no remedy for a citizen faced with discrimi-
natory practices overseas. Because the right to equal employment op-
portunity has been widely recognized, however, the practical effect
may not be as harsh as it seems. For example, American corporations
operating in Europe are subject to the European labor laws. It is
therefore unlikely that a corporation that is required to give equal
treatment to its European employees will refuse such treatment to its
American employees.
Conversely, in countries which have not yet adopted appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women, Americans have
no recourse. For example, Japan still has a long way to go in enforcing
153 See Cook, supra note 16, at 708.
154 See Cook, supra note 16, at 709.
155 See Cook, supra note 16, at 709.
156 See Cook, supra note 16, at 711.
157 See Cook, supra note 16, at 711.
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non-discrimination legislation. Companies that can get away with dis-
criminating against Japanese citizens will have no reason to treat
American citizens any differently.
The only true way for American women to be assured of their
right to work free of discrimination is an amendment by Congress to
apply Title VII of the Civil Rights Code extraterritorially. Congress
has taken this step before with the Age in Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA).158 Because of the inequities of denying the age
discrimination rights to U.S. citizens abroad, Congress responded by
amending the ADEA in 1984 to make it applicable to U.S. citizens
employed abroad by American companies.159 An analogous argu-
ment may be made both for and against applying Title VII extraterri-
torially. On the one hand, since gender discrimination has received
more protection as a "suspect classification" than age discrimination
within the United States, it only makes sense that Congress also
amend Title VII to apply extraterritorilly. On the other hand, since
Congress has not yet amended Title VII, it may be stating its intention
to apply the Act within the United States only. However, Congress'
inaction may be due to lack of proof of inequities overseas, or to lack
of awareness by Congress of this extraterritorial anomaly.
C. The European Community
The European Community enforces its policies mainly through
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 60 The ECJ interprets and ap-
plies the law of the EEC Treaties when disputes arise, acting to elimi-
nate differences that exist between EC laws and the national laws of
member states.' 6 ' The ECJ has the authority to interpret EC law and
apply it to specific cases. 62 National courts may also call upon the
ECJ to interpret Community law.'63 Once the ECJ has issued a judg-
ment, courts in member states must then assure that the judgment is
properly carried out, there are no avenues for appeal from ECJ deci-
sions.'" However, because this obligation is not backed up by any
specific legal, as opposed to political, sanctions, enforcement is not
always assured.165
158 Street, supra note 1, at 500 n.9.
159 Street, supra note 1, at 500 n.9.
160 Hemphill, European Court of Justice: 1990 Cases, 4 TRANSNAT'L. LAW 123, 124-25 (1991).
161 Id
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163 Id. at 125.
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Cases brought to the ECJ fall into two categories. The first cate-
gory consists of actions against member states.'66 The ECJ has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over allegations that a member state has failed to
fulfill its obligations under the EC.167 The second category of cases
brought before the ECJ consist of actions against Community
institutions. 68
ECJ decisions have the effect of superseding national law.'
69
Moreover, Community provisions that have a "direct effect" before
national courts must be applied over any contradictory national
rule.' 70 Individuals may not, however, rely on provisions of directives
as against other individuals.' 7 1 This means that a woman cannot in-
yoke Community provisions against a private employer.
1. Enforcement of Community Directives
The Community Directives on sex discrimination have been en-
forced in two ways. First, the European Commission, responsible for
proposing and enforcing legislation, may take proceedings before the
ECJ against a member state which has failed to bring its law in line
with Community law.' 72 If the action is successful, the Court issues a
judgment in the form of a declaration that the member state has failed
to comply with its obligations. 7 ' This declaration is binding on the
member state to put an end to the infringement. 174 Again, however,
the sanction is purely "international," not legal, and only remedies
matters for the future.175 Thus, this is not a private remedy, and wo-
men subjected to discrimination prior to the decision do not recover
as a result.
The second method of enforcement of Community directives al-
lows individuals a private right of action. 76 Individuals may rely upon
Community provisions before national courts if one of two conditions
are met. First, an individual may rely upon a Community provision if
the terms of the regulation impose an obligation upon public bodies,
166 Hemphill, supra note 160, at 125-26.
167 Hemphill, supra note 160, at 125.
168 Hemphill, supra note 160, at 125.
169 Hemphill, supra note 160, at 126.
170 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 21.
171 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 24.
172 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 24.
173 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 24.
174 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 24.
175 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 24.
176 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 24.
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individuals, or both.'77 Second, if the provision is an article of the
Treaty or of a directive which has been interpreted by the Court as
having a direct effect and is "unconditional and sufficiently precise" so
as to create an enforceable obligation, an individual may invoke the
Community provision.178 Such individual actions are effective against
existing discrimination, without waiting for national law to be modi-
fied, if the alleged discriminator is one against whom the provision
may be invoked. 179 However, the Community directives on sex dis-
crimination may only be invoked against member states, not private
employers. Thus, women may not rely on the Community provisions
as against a private employer. Both methods of enforcement have
been addressed by the ECJ.
2. Specific ECJ Decisions
The Court has allowed national courts wide discretion in inter-
preting their own social policies, and has resorted to strict construc-
tion of the equal treatment principle.'8 0 As a result, when issues are
not explicitly addressed in the directives, the Court has been unwilling
to apply and enforce them.''
In two 1984 cases, the ECJ addressed the issue of whether reme-
dies provided by the Federal Republic of Germany for discrimination
in hiring complied with the Equal Treatment Directive. 8 In the first
case, Van Colson v. Nordhein-Westfalen, s3 two women applied for po-
sitions as social workers at a prison."8 Both had completed intern-
ships at the prison and sought full time positions, but were rejected
because they were women.'8 5 In Harz v. Deutsch, s6 the plaintiff,
Harz, applied for a management trainee position with a multinational
firm and was also rejected on the basis of her sex.' 87 The plaintiffs in
both cases brought an action requesting that they be offered contracts
of employment, or, in the alternative, damages for six months
wages.' 8 8 Their final plea was for damages under national law.'" 9
177 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 24.
178 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 24.
179 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 24.
180 Harvey, supra note 72, at 58.
181 Harvey, supra note 72, at 58.
182 Harvey, supra note 72, at 58-59.
183 Case 14/83, Von Colson v. Land Nordhein-Westfalen, E.C.R. 1891 (1984).
184 Id. at 1893.
185 Il at 1893.
186 Case 79/83, Harz v. Deutsche Tradax, GmbH, 1984 E.C.R. 1921, 2 C.M.L.R. 430 (1986).
187 Id
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The national courts in both cases held that the plaintiffs were en-
titled to recover only the costs of their application. 9 ' For Harz, this
was just DM 2.31, the cost of the bus ride to the interview.' 91 The
national courts did, however, refer to the ECJ the question of whether
the statutory remedy of cost of application implemented the equal
treatment directive adequately. 92 The ECJ held that it did not.' 93
The Court concluded that the equal treatment directive requires each
member state to provide effective sanctions for violation of the direc-
tive.1 94 The Court further held that the sanctions must fulfill two re-
quirements: the sanctions (1) must be such so as to guarantee "real
and effective judicial protection"; and (2) must also have a real deter-
rent effect on the employer. 95 The practical effect of this decision is
that, while member states are required to provide sanctions for dis-
criminatory practices, the victim of sex discrimination is entirely de-
pendent upon her national law with respect to the award of
compensation as well as to the choice of suitable remedies. 96 Fur-
ther, member states are not required to impose a sanction upon an
employer that would force the employer to enter into an employment
contract with the victim.197 National courts are thus given wide discre-
tion in interpreting their own social policies.
The Court addressed enforcement of the equal treatment direc-
tive through an action by the European Commission, rather than by
an individual, against a member state in Commission v. Federal Re-
public of Germany (FRG).'98 In this case, the Commission main-
tained that FRG law regarding gender neutral advertising was
inadequate because it did not provide a legal remedy for violations.199
The ECJ, however, held that the failure to provide a remedy did not
violate the equal treatment directive.200 Although the Court agreed
that advertising was closely connected with access to employment, it
balanced this concern against the fact that the directive does not re-
quire member states to enact a specific provision regarding advertising
189 Harvey, supra note 72, at 59.
190 Harvey, supra note 72, at 59.
191 Harz v. Deutsche Traday GmbH, 1984 E.C.R. 1921.
192 Harvey, supra note 72, at 59-60.
193 Harvey, supra note 72, at 60.
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196 Argiros, supra note 71, at 166.
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and thus concluded that the provision is not covered by the direc-
tive.201 This decision clearly demonstrates the Court's unwillingness
to extend the directive beyond what was originally intended by the
Community.2°
Another issue arose in Commission v. FRG regarding whether
the Federal Republic of Germany was justified in exempting certain
occupations from the principle of equal treatment. 20 3 The equal treat-
ment provision requires member states to assess whether they are jus-
tified in maintaining existing exclusions from equal treatment.2 4 The
Commission complained that the FRG did not do this, nor did it pro-
vide the Commission with the list of exempted occupations as re-
quired.2 °5 In this regard, the ECJ held that the FRG was in
derogation of its duties.2 6 The Court then laid out a two-step process
for assessing the continued validity of exclusions: member states first
must regularly thoroughly review exclusions to determine if they are
warranted, and, second, member states must forward these results to
the Commission. 20 7 The Commission must then determine if the ex-
ceptions are in compliance with the directive. 208 In this regard, the
ECJ decision expanded Community authority over member states by
holding that exceptions to the principle should be minimized.20 9
Finally, the Court further narrowed the effect of the equal treat-
ment directive in Marshall v. Southampton and South-west Hampshire
Area Health Authority.210 In this case, the Court rejected a "horizon-
tal effect" of the equality directive, meaning that the binding nature of
the directive existed only in relation to the member state; the directive
could not be relied upon against a private employer.21' An individual
may, however, rely upon the directive against her member state, re-
gardless of the capacity in which the state is acting, whether as an
employer or a public authority.212 This decision has been criticized for
making an arbitrary and unfair distinction between state employees
201 Id. at 1488.
202 Harvey, supra note 72, at 61.
203 Harvey, supra note 72, at 62.
204 Harvey, supra note 72, at 62.
205 Harvey, supra note 72, at 62.
206 Harvey, supra note 72, at 62.
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and private employees.21 Under this decision, state employees may
rely on the directive directly as against their employer, private em-
ployees, without an implementing measure created by national law,
may not.214
Thus, while the ECJ provides a means for enforcement of the
Community directive, significant problems remain. First, there are no
specific sanctions for discriminatory practices in the directive itself,
the plaintiff is at the mercy of national law for her remedy. Second,
the Court has been unwilling to apply the directive to areas not explic-
itly addressed by the directive, which allows for different amounts of
protection afforded in different member states.21 5 Finally, women
faced with discrimination may not bring an action against a private
employer unless there is a national prohibition. If there is no national
prohibition, a woman must take on her nation.
D. Japan
Japan's use of the principle of voluntarism in its Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Law to eliminate discrimination against women
provides little recourse for a woman faced with discriminatory prac-
tices. Further, because the EEOL does not provide either sanctions
for noncompliance or a private right of action, enforcement of the
right to equal employment opportunity is virtually impossible.
Possible recourse may be had under Japan's Civil Code article 90.
This article has an all purpose provision stating that "a juridical act
undertaken for any purpose contrary to the public order or good
morals is null and void." '216 Article 90 was used as the legal basis for
relief from sex discrimination in the areas of pay and retirement.217
The EEOL may also have broadened the areas of discrimination cov-
ered by "public order or good morals" so as to cover the areas of
recruitment, hiring, job assignment and promotion.218 The problem,
however, is determining what constitutes a juridical act.
213 Argiros, supra note 71, at 182.
214 Harvey, supra note 72, at 182.
215 These first two problems may be solved by the implementation of unified labor laws under
a single European market. However, many Europeans are unwilling to entrust what has always
been seen as national social policy to the technocrats that run the European Community from
Brussels. In fact, objections to the Maastricht Treaty have been specifically based on this
complaint.
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Further, courts may recognize a private right of action when the
social consensus in Japan recognizes an absolute right in women to be
free from discrimination in employment. Still, the personal costs of
litigation will probably remain too great for most Japanese women.
Presently, Japanese women may only request assistance in resolv-
ing disputes, or, through complaints, invoke one of the mediation
mechanisms provided by the EEOL. The prospect of litigation as a
remedy remains non-existent.
III. ANALYsis: OUTLOOK FOR WOMEN ASSERTING THE RIGHT TO
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
It has been demonstrated that enforcement of the right to equal
employment opportunity is a formidable challenge. Litigation is the
quickest and most effective means of bringing about change. How-
ever, because of the burden that litigation places on a woman, change
will only be effected by the bravest or most severely discriminated
against. As such, change is not likely to, and has not, occurred over-
night. The implementation of legal remedies was a gradual process,
and enforcement of such remedies will continue to be gradual.
A. The Use of Litigation
Litigation has provided the quickest means for bringing a discrim-
inatory employer into compliance with the principle of equal opportu-
nity. Sanctions are also an effective means of forcing compliance
because of their deterrent effect. The enforcement of such sanctions
almost always occurs through litigation, however, as demonstrated by
the ECJ decisions. As such, the combination of litigation and sanc-
tions is effective in bringing discriminatory employers into compliance
when those employers see that sanctions are being enforced by the
courts. Japanese law provides neither for litigation nor for sanctions.
Therefore, it is impossible to study the effect of sanctions in the ab-
sence of litigation.
Litigation occurs both on the national and international level.
Thus, in the United States and the EC countries, an individual may
assert her rights against a private employer in the national courts. If
the national law does not provide an adequate remedy, a European
woman may challenge her national law in the ECJ. Because ECJ de-
cisions are binding, national law must be modified to comply and
change is thus effected. While this may not be adequate for the actual
victim of discrimination, such action creates a national forum in which
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women in the future can assert their right to equal employment
opportunity.
Japan has chosen not to provide litigation as a remedy for women
who have been discriminated against. As a result, change has oc-
curred very slowly. While this may be appropriate in a country which
is not entirely ready to treat women as equals, it certainly is not ideal
for those women who are ready to assert their right to equal
opportunity.
B. Burdens of Litigation
Litigation can be extremely burdensome, however. Even in the
United States, where the courts have been extensively used as a
means for fighting discrimination, a woman has much to lose by filing
a lawsuit. Lawsuits can be very expensive, and many women do not
have the means to bring a successful action against a much wealthier
and powerful employer. Further, while there is not the same cultural
aversion to litigation as in Japan, an American woman faces the risk of
being labeled as a troublemaker if she decides to use the courts to
enforce her rights. This label may even prevent her from obtaining
other employment. A woman may also lose the friendship of her co-
workers when she decides to file suit. Finally, the emotional toll that a
lawsuit takes on a woman is far from insignificant. A long, drawn out
confrontation is inherently stressful. Due to crowded dockets, em-
ployer foot dragging, and long discovery periods for discrimination
suits, a woman must bear an extremely extended period of stress and
possible unemployment. It is no surprise then that many women, even
in the United States, decide that an expensive, drawn out, and stress-
ful law suit just is not worth the trouble.
Women in Europe face all of these same problems with respect to
litigation. European women are additionally faced with challenging
their country if national law does not offer adequate protection from
discrimination. Not only is this prospect daunting, but the chances of
a suit successfully reaching the ECJ are slight. Finally, because of the
deference the ECJ affords national law and because of the Court's
narrow construction of EC directives, a favorable opinion is unlikely.
Even if litigation were an available remedy to women in Japan,
the social stigma attached to bringing a lawsuit would be unbearable
for the majority of women. As such, little change would be effected
through litigation in Japan.
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C. Outlook for women asserting the right to equal employment
opportunity
Women in Japan are in the weakest position to assert their right
to equal employment opportunities. Unlike women in the United
States and Europe, Japanese women do not seem ready to assert their
right to equal employment opportunity. This is due in part to the cul-
tural aversion to litigation. As such, there is no real forum for Japa-
nese women to claim protection from discrimination, and because
litigation creates the greatest impetus for change, it is not likely that
Japanese women will gain the right to equal opportunity in the near
future. Based on availability of remedies, European women are in
the strongest position to assert their right to equal employment oppor-
tunity. First, the EC has mandated that all member states provide
such a right. While much international law suffers from ineffective-
ness, EC law has a strong effect both because it can be directly appli-
cable to individual citizens and because it supersedes national law.219
Second, European women may assert their rights both in national
courts and the European Court of Justice. Moreover, European wo-
men are protected from discrimination based on sex when working for
American corporations in the United States due to the alien exemp-
tion provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Code. Finally, women in
the EC may avoid a lawsuit altogether by filing a complaint with the
Commission, who then takes action against the member state if it feels
that the member state is not fulfilling its duties under the directive.
Again, this does not provide an individual remedy, but it is a means of
effecting change for the future.
Women in the EC may be in an even better position to claim the
right to equal employment opportunity under the new, single Euro-
pean market. Under a unified Europe, all women in the EC should be
protected to the same extent, in whatever member state they choose
to work. This is similar to the protection American women are af-
forded in the United States. However, it is too soon to gauge the ac-
tual effect of the unified social policy contained in the Maastricht
Treaty. The Social Charter and Social Action Program have enjoyed
the least support, especially in Great Britain.220 As unlikely as it is, if
the Social Action Program were able to gain acceptance, the provision
calling for the abolishment of sex discrimination requires that discrim-
inatory employers be liable for damages.22 Although the EC cur-
219 Roundtable, supra note 22, at 3.
220 Dowling, supra note 85, at 614.
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rently requires that sanctions be imposed for discriminatory practices,
such sanctions are uniform under the Social Action Program, and wo-
men are not forced to rely on national law for appropriate damages as
in the past. While women in the EC have the most legal remedies
available to them, however, the difficulty of enforcement makes
equality in fact only a hope for the future.
American women have had a longer recognized right to equal
employment opportunity within the United States, but lack the ability
that EC women have of asserting that right abroad. Within the EC,
American women may not be at too much of a disadvantage because
corporations are required to offer equal employment opportunity and,
based on ECJ decisions, must be sanctioned if they do not. Thus,
there is no reason to think that corporations will treat its American
employees any differently than its European employees with respect
to discrimination. In less progressive countries, however, the outlook
is dim for American women unless Congress amends Title VII as it
amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
The ADEA was amended within the reauthorization of the Older
Americans Act in 1984 .1 The Act was amended by specifying that
the term "employee" under the Act includes any individual who is a
citizen of the United States employed by a United States employer in
a workplace in a foreign country.t -3 It further specified, however, that
it is not unlawful for an employer to take any action prohibited by the
Act when such practices involve an employee in a foreign workplace
and where compliance with the ADEA would cause the employer to
violate the laws of the country in which the workplace is located. 4 It
would thus seem that the best way to address an amendment to Title
VII is within a new Civil Right Rights Act. Although legislation has
been introduced to amend Title VII, it would be even more effective
to place such legislation in the same context as the ADEA amend-
ment, as one part of a broader Act. The Amendment should be pat-
terned after the 1984 ADEA amendment so as to accentuate the
arbitrary application of protection for United States citizens. As such,
a provision exempting employers operating in countries whose laws
would be violated by the amendment must be included. This would
meet the Supreme Court's concern of a conflict of laws problem, and
would probably have little effect upon women's rights, since even a
country like Japan has its own Equal Employment Opportunity Law.
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